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Cutting back greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation will be a vital 
step in solving the global climate crisis. Monetizing the value of standing forests through 
Reduced Emissions from avoided Deforestation and forest Degradation, or REDD, could be 
crucial to forest conservation, befitting both the climate, communities, and biodiversity. These 
projects, currently being developed for the voluntary carbon market, are impacting some of the 
last remaining forests around the world, which are used by over 1 billion forest-dependent 
people. In this thesis I identify 12 indicators from community forest management literature that 
tend to predict success in conservation goals,and use these factor to analyze 23 REDD projects 
developing in Indonesia. I finds that most REDD projects in Indonesia are likely to fail to 
conserve carbon, based on these indicators. Nonetheless, most projects do not ignore 
communities; this thesis also explores the mechanisms by which these projects attempt to 
provide alternative livelihoods and incentives for community members, and looks at the 
challenges created by that model. Finally, I explore four groupings of REDD projects in 
Indonesia, based on their community engagement mechanisms, and discuss the overall likelihood 
for conservation success in Indonesia.  
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This thesis aims to create a theoretical framework to help predict if REDD projects in Indonesia 
will be successful in achieving their conservation goals. Until recently, scholarship has been 
focused on what might happen with REDD projects (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2009; Agrawal and 
Angelson 2009), but only now are actual planning documents becoming available, documents 
that provide realistic insight into how REDD will developed in the future. These planning 
documents can provide a source of information, as yet poorly accessed, on help understand how 
projects will develop. In this thesis, I aim to use those project planning documents, as well as 
interviews with project developers, to understand how directly impacted communities will be 
engaged in REDD projects. I will use the literature on community-based forest management to 
identify a set of  indicators that help predict success  in achieving conservation goals based on 
project planning data, and will apply that framework to existing REDD projects. I will ask the 
question, should we predict that REDD projects in their planned form will or will not be 
successful in their goal of conserving carbon? I hypothesize that we would predict that REDD 
projects will fail in their goal to conserve carbon. 
Communities and Conservation: Towards Success Indicators for REDD
The role of communities in conservation has been a topic of heated debate ever since Garret 
Hardin posited that common pool resource use would necessarily result in resource degradation, 
and that only state-established institutional arrangements-- central government and private 
property-- would be able to sustain the commons (Hardin 1968). This line of thinking supported 
the development of exclusionary national parks, where people were denied access to national
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 park land, regardless of their traditional or historical relationship to that land. Hardin's work 
inspired common property rights theorists to search for alternative explanations. These theorists 
(Ostrom 1990, Wade 1988) have studied how communities organize and develop institutions for 
management of the commons. This research has found that while community-based institutions 
for governing the commons have sometimes failed to conserve resources, so have other types of 
institutions (Dietz et al 2003). Research has found that common pool resources can be 
successfully conserved, but that this depends on the conditions of the resource, the user group, 
and outside pressures (Agrawal 2007). 
If REDD projects can be considered a form of Community Forest Management (CFM), then it 
should follow that prior research on the conditions of successful CFM should be able to help 
predict if REDD projects will or will not be successful in their conservation goals. I argue that 
REDD project management must be considered a problem of Community Forest Management 
(CFM). Simply defined, CFM combines two things: a type of resource (forests) and a class of 
owner/manager (communities) (Chhatre and Agrawal 2008). Community forests are often 
contrasted with forests under open access, government, or private ownership, but the complex 
reality is that forest management often combines different elements of different management 
structures. This is particularly true in a country like Indonesia, which has a history of weak 
institutional oversight of natural resource management, and where these institutions have 
changed dramatically recent history (Barr, 2010). In these situations, formal laws and regulations 
may exist to manage forests, but at the forest level, communities often continue to manage their 
forests as they have done for generations. Therefore, even in forests that are legally owned by the 
government or by private property owners, actual management is done by the communities. 
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Such is the case with REDD; forest concessions may be legally owned by the government, but 
are actually managed at the community level. These communities often still use traditional land 
management practices that existed long before the government took legal ownership. Therefore 
the land is under de facto management by the community, even where projects where 
communities do not have legal rights. Except in areas where there are absolutely no forest users, 
REDD projects that aim to conserve carbon must – by necessity – address the fact that the forest 
is a vital component of local livelihoods. These projects can either forcefully remove forest users 
from the project area-- an option which can be very costly, and can put the project developer at 
risk of vocal criticism from activists-- or they can choose to engage the community. Once the 
decision has been made to engage the community, as has been the case in all projects surveyed, 
REDD projects can be considered through the lens of community forest management. At this 
point, one of the selling points of REDD projects – over other sources of carbon credits – is that 
they come with co-benefits for the community and for biodiversity, which means that it is likely 
that most projects will not continue down the route of excluding communities from the forest 
(Hamilton, 2009). 
Towards developing CFM Sustainability Indicators 
Assuming the premise that most REDD projects can be considered community forest 
management problems, it becomes interesting to see what characteristics of CFM might to 
predict successful conservation outcomes. A survey of the scholarship identified four main 
clusters of characteristics that are relevant to successful governance of the commons (Agrawal 
2001, Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009), summarized below:  
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Characteristics of the Resource System: Resource system characteristics are biophysical factors 
including 
• resource size
• clarity of physical boundaries (are there rivers, roads, etc)
• value of the resource (how much do people rely on the resource?)
• ease of monitoring 
• overlap of user group and resource location 
Research has found that common property arrangements are more likely to be sustainable when 
the resource system is relatively large (between 5,000 and 10,000 ha) (Chhatre and Agrawal, 
2009). Information on  forests larger than that has not been collected. Although this may be large 
for a community forest, it is relatively small for a national park or conservation area, including 
most REDD projects. Better conservation results are predicted when the boundaries of the 
system are well defined (Wade 1988, Ostrom 1990)—for example, when the boundaries are 
rivers instead of arbitrary points in a forest. There are also likely to be better results when there is 
fair allocation of resources (Baland and Platteau, 1996). High levels of dependence on the 
resource (Wade 1988) tends to lead to better conservation results. Finally, overlap between user 
group location and resource location (Wade 1988, Baland and Platteau 1996) leads to better 
resource management. 
Characteristics of the User Group: User group characteristics include variables such as 
• group size
• heterogeneity (are the users of the same ethnic group, socio-economic class, etc?)
• interdependence (how much do group members depend on each other?)
• technical capacity of the managing community
• institutional capacity of the managing community
• economic capacity of the managing community. 
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Research has found that a greater level of interdependence among resource users tends to result in 
better forest management (Ostrom 1990, Wade 1988). The availability of resources to undertake 
monitoring-- for example, resources to pay forest guards or purchase technological tools like 
GPS-- can help improve conservation results (Agrawal, 2009). Increased heterogenity within a 
group tends to lead to poorer conservation results, with characteristics such as gender, 
indigenous status, ethnicity, class and income being particularly relevant (Larson, 2003), . 
Groups that are relatively well-off and small-to-medium sized (Wade 1988, Baland and Platteau 
1996), also tend to have better forest management results. 
Characteristics of Institutions: Studies of CFM have shown that resource management is 
enhanced by certain institutional characteristics, such as
• tenure security
• ability of local groups to devise management rules 
• use of local knowledge
• understandable and locally enforceable rules
• supportive national legislation
Research has found that tenure security enables communities to think long term about managing 
the land, and develop institutions that facilitate long term sustainable management. The ability of 
local groups to devise rules that include sanctioning, conflict resolution, and accountability 
mechanisms tends to lead to improved conservation outcomes, as does the ability to exclude 
others (Ostrom 1990, Wade 1988, Baland and Platteau 1996). Local knowledge is necessary for 
designing and enforcing effective rules (Gibson et al, 2005; Chhatre and Agrawal 2008).  These 
rules also need to be easily understood and locally enforceable (Ostrom 1990, Wade 1988, 
Baland and Platteau 1996). National-level legislation that supports and enables local 
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management has also been shown to be important in facilitating the success of these projects 
(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Ribot et al 2006).
Characteristics of the External Environment: All projects occur within a wider context, broadly 
defined by demographic, cultural, technological, and market related factors. Key factors include
• wider market context
• presence of external sanctioning institutions 
• appropriate levels of external aid
Research has found that market pressures and population levels/changes are key causal factors in 
deforestation (Angleson and Kaimowitz, 1999), with higher levels of volatility predicting more 
negative impacts (Bray et al, 2004). Common property management is likely to be best when the 
central government does not undermine local authority (Wade 1988, Ostrom 1990), when there 
are supportive external sanctioning institutions (Baland and Platteau 1996), there are appropriate 
levels of external aid to compensate for conservation activities (Baland and Platteau 1996), and 
there are nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, and governance (Ostrom 1990). 
In order to generate indicators that can be used to help predict success in conserving carbon,  I 
summarized the literature on CFM, and identified which indicators were mentioned the most 
often, and which were most strongly correlated with conservation success.  This work resulted in 
the 12 variables summarized below:
Figure 3: Key Factors Predicting Success in CFM
Characteristics Group  Factors Predicting Success in CFM
Resource System Medium to Large Forest
Clear of project boundaries 
High reliance on the resource
User Group Small-to-medium sized community
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Members of group are highly dependent on each other
Relatively well-off
Institutional Arrangements Locally designed and accepted rules 
Users have legal rights to the land
Rules that are easy to understand and enforce
External Environment Stable Government
Stable Market Price for the Resource 
Understanding the realities of REDD
Using these variables provides a lens through which to understand REDD projects developing in 
Indonesia. Only projects in Indonesia were selected for this project, for a number or reasons. 
First, using examples from only one country provides a standard political and economic baseline, 
which makes it easier to compare the impact of different variables. Also, Indonesia has the 
highest rate of deforestation in the world, and therefore is considered by many to be the “ground 
zero” for the development of mechanisms to halt deforestation. As of 2009, Indonesia was home 
to over half of the REDD projects being developed internationally. At the same time, forests in 
Indonesia are vital to the livelihoods of thousands of communities, and have been so for 
uncounted generations. Therefore, Indonesia provides the largest sample size, both in terms of 
number of hectares protected, as well as number of people impacted, in the world. Indonesia, 
then, offers the best case study for understanding how communities are and will be impacted by 
REDD projects. 
Research Results:
Analysis of REDD projects through the lens of CFM  indicators resulted in a bleak picture for 
those who are interested in halting climate change through REDD. What I found was that REDD 
projects tended to fall into the following patterns:  
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• Resource System: REDD projects in Indonesia tended to be extremely large, far larger 
than forests generally studied in the CFM literature. The physical characteristics tended 
to vary widely, but only in a few cases were the boundaries tied to physical landmarks or 
traditional forest boundaries. 
• User Group: Because the forests tended to be so large, the communities who use the 
forest tend to be extremely diverse-- ethnically, historically, and in terms of wealth. In 
many cases communities may not traditionally have worked together to manage the 
forest, and are not dependent on each other. In most cases, however, communities were 
highly dependent on the forest. 
• Institutional Arrangements: Here, again, there are substantial differences in how projects 
engage communities in decision making. The majority of projects tend, however, to 
follow a model of community consultation, instead of starting with the community in 
building management rules based off off traditional practices. In these cases, 
communities are still engaged in the projects, but through passive mechanisms, as 
discussed below. 
• External environment: A history of political instability in Indonesia has made laws 
governing forest management at the forest level extremely unstable, which has been 
augmented by a lack of funds and corruption that has only made the law less reliable. At 
the same time, the international market for REDD offsets remains under negotiation, and 
it is still unclear how much REDD credits will trade for, and what the market for those 
credits will be. 
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Using the CFM success indicators as a guide, one would predict that the majority of REDD 
projects in Indonesia will be unsuccessful at conserving carbon. Of course, community 
engagement is only one component of overall project success; the development of the 
international market, prices of other forest commodities, etc, will also play a role in overall 
success. Nonetheless, from a community engagement perspective, research results agree with the 
hypothesis. There is hope, however, in that a small minority of projects are prioritizing 
community engagement, and are using the lessons of community based forest management and 
working to prioritize community members an integral to the REDD project planning process. 
Despite the fact that communities were not engaged as decision makers in most projects, all 
projects included some form of community involvement as a core component project 
development. This engagement tended to be more “passive”, and included giving of gifts to the 
community, the provision of schools and health clinics, the giving of cash payments, and job 
creation activities. This is a marked departure from older methods of forest conservation, which 
involved restricting community access to the forest, and punishing those people that broke those 
rules. More details about specific community engagement mechanisms and passive benefits 
sharing are detailed in chapter four. 
Overview
In this thesis, I will explore REDD project development in Indonesia through the lens of 
indicators defined by the CFM literature. In chapter two, I will provide background on carbon 
trading and the development of REDD. I will also focus in on community involvement in REDD, 
and why many projects have not followed the model of simply removing people from project 
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areas. In chapter three, I will explore all 23 projects surveyed, through the lens of CFM 
indicators. In chapter four, I will explore the more indirect, or passive, mechanisms that projects 
are using to engage communities. In chapter 5, I will conclude by identifying four major trends 
in community engagement in REDD projects, and look at their potential for failure or success in 





REDD in Context: Conservation, Communities and the Market
The Global Climate Crisis in the Context of Community Rights 
Human-caused increases in atmospheric CO2 and other gases are leading to an increase in global 
temperatures, resulting in increasingly severe weather patterns around the globe. According to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), we must reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions to stabilize carbon levels at 350 parts per million from the current—and steadily 
increasing—387 ppm in order to support ecosystems functions as they exist now (IPCC, 2007). 
To do this, it is necessary to curtail emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, which 
account for 15 to 20 percent of all annual greenhouse gas emissions (CIFOR, 2009). When 
forests are destroyed or degraded, we lose a valuable carbon sink: recent studies have suggested 
that just under five billion of the 32 billion tons of carbon dioxide emitted annually through 
human activity are absorbed by forests (CIFOR, 2009). 
The public acknowledgment of the climate crisis has resulted in a rush to come up with 
solutions. One of the most prominent attempts at a solution has been the development of a global 
market for carbon. In a carbon market, companies or governments set limits or caps on the 
amount of carbon dioxide that they allow to be emitted. Companies (or other entities) are issued 
emission permits and are required to hold an equivalent number of allowances (or carbon 
credits) which represent the right to emit a specific amount. The total amount of allowances and 
credits cannot exceed the cap, limiting total emissions to that level. Companies that want to emit 
more than allowed must buy credits from those who pollute less. The buying and selling of these 
allowances is referred to as carbon trading. The carbon market promises to help ease the 
16
financial pain of reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by having poor countries reduce or 
avoid emissions and sell the resulting carbon credits to polluters in rich countries. These traded 
emission credits are known as “carbon offsets”.  Similar types of markets have been developed 
for a number of different pollutants, most prominently sulfur dioxide in the Midwestern United 
States, which succeeded in curtailing acid rain in the United States. 
Reduced Emissions from Avoided Deforestation or forest Degradation, or REDD for short,   is 
an important part of the carbon market's answer to how to deal with forest-related emissions. 
Simply put, REDD allows countries to get paid (either through a crediting/offset system, or 
through a fund) for avoiding emissions that would have occurred if forests were either clear cut 
or degraded (see Figure 1). REDD is not the first type of forest carbon project to exist on the 
market— credits from tree planting projects, known as afforestation/reforestation projects, have 
been traded for the last twenty years (Hamilton, 2009). REDD, on the other hand, allows for 
financial rewards for keeping existing forests standing. Although the actually amount of carbon 
stored through REDD can be much harder to calculate, preserving existing forests also means 
preserving the rich biodiversity and important livelihood benefits that standing forests provide. 
The development of the market assumes that it is cheaper for developing countries to maintain 
their forests than to for developed countries to install technology which would decrease 
pollution, which means it would make financial sense for countries to purchase credits from 
REDD projects than to put money into reducing emissions from their factories. REDD has 
gained considerable interest in recent years because the poorest countries are often those with the 
most tropical forests, and therefore stand to make a great deal of money on the forest carbon 
market. 
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Figure 1: Quantifying REDD credits- A Simplified Graph
Although understanding forests in terms of their carbon emissions is important, it is not enough. 
According to the World Bank, there are 1.2 billion people who depend on the forests for their 
livelihoods (CIFOR, 2009).  More than half a billion people rely on forest to provide “substantial 
livelihoods benefits” (World Bank, 2004). Less than 10% of that forest, however, is legally 
owned by communities or indigenous peoples (Sunderlin, 2008). Often, governments do not 
challenge a community’s use of the land until they have an opportunity to profit off of it (RRI, 
2009). These are also communities who have customary rules for  forest management, often 
based on complex and site-specific variables that have evolved over generations (Cotula, 2009). 
While the rights of indigenous communities to these forests have been enshrined in the United 
Nations- Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, these rights are rarely respected on the 
ground. Forests also hold wealth in terms of plant and animal biodiversity, as well as ecosystem 
services. 
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The Forest Carbon Market
Credits from forest carbon have, up to now, only been a very small in the overall carbon market. 
However, this market is being developed rapidly as the potential for cheap carbon saving 
measures are being developed in tropical forests (Hamilton, 2010, Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2009). 
The carbon market can be is divided into two broad categories:
• Compliance Market: Compliance markets are created and regulated by mandatory 
regional, national, and international carbon reduction regimes, such as the Kyoto Protocol 
and the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme. In 2008, 4146 metric tons of CO2 
were traded on the compliance market, with the market value of US$117,582 million 
(Hamilton, 2009). The compliance market currently accepts credits from tree planting 
(afforestation and reforestation), but it does not accept credits from REDD. It is highly 
likely that REDD will be included in any future international emissions reductions 
schemes. If and when that happens, demand for REDD credits is likely to increase 
dramatically. 
• The Voluntary Market: The voluntary carbon market functions outside of the compliance 
market, enabling companies and individuals to purchase carbon offsets on a voluntary 
basis. Purchasers of credits in this market are motivated by a personal desire to reduce 
emissions, or to improve their public image. This market sold 123.4 metric tons of CO2  in 
2008, with a market value of US $704.8 million. The voluntary market accepts credits 
from all forms of forest carbon projects, including REDD. The voluntary market for 
forest carbon has existed since the early 1990s, when environmental non-profits and 
corporations initiated partnerships to conserve and plant forests with the aim of balancing 
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greenhouse gas emissions. The voluntary carbon market has actually been far more 
important than the compliance market in terms of the sale of forest credits (See Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Total area Affected by Different Certifications-Including Afforestation and  
Reforestation, REDD, etc. (in Hectares) (Edited from Hamilton, 2010)
   
REDD in the Forest Carbon Marketplace 
While REDD is still a relatively new part of the forest carbon market globally —the first project 
is due to be fully certified in November 2010 (pers. com. Todd Lemons, Infinite Earth)—demand 
for REDD credits is strong, as gauged by pre-sale of REDD credits (Hamilton, 2010). As of 
2009, there were 44 REDD projects being developed internationally (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 
2009), and the number is steadily growing. The primary motivation for the purchase of offsets in 
the voluntary market is public relations and commitments that companies have made to corporate 
social responsibility (Hamilton, 2010). Private companies dominate the market for voluntary 
carbon credits, currently purchasing 66% of the overall credits (Hamilton, 2010). Individual and 
NGO purchases of carbon credits – for offsetting flights, for instance – amounts to only 1-2% of 
all carbon sales. A survey by leading players in the carbon market reported that around 90% of 
respondents view avoided deforestation and native tree reforestation projects as the most 
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desirable forestry projects, followed by agro-forestry (81%) and peat land conservation (75%) 
(Hamilton, 2010). These projects were cited as being the most interesting because they cost far 
less than installing carbon sequestering technology at the emissions source, and also protected 
ecosystems that are critical for biodiversity conservation.     
Forest Carbon Certifications: 
In order for a REDD project to generate tradeable credits, projects must adhere to standards set 
by an recognized certifying group. In the early years of the forest carbon market, there were 10 
standard setters vying to make their certification standard the most important in the market 
(Kollmuss, 2009). These included certifications developed by NGOs (the World Wildlife Fund, 
for example), as well as private industry. This initial period of competition is over, and in terms 
of market share, two certifications are dominating the international carbon market for forest 
carbon (Hamilton, 2010):
• Voluntary Carbon Standard- Agriculture Forestry and Other Land Use (VCS-AFOLU): 
The VCS-AFLOU standard allows for credits from afforestation and reforestation, 
agricultural land management, improved forest management, and reduced emissions from 
deforestation and degradation (REDD). The VCS-AFLOU does not address community 
involvement, and does not consider co-benefits, like community livelihoods and 
biodiversity. The VCS-AFOLU does not take into account international leakage or 
market shifting, although it does address those concerns within a country. 
• Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance Standard (CCBS): The CCBS is a project 
design standard that does not actually issue credits, but instead offers rules and guidance 
for project design and development to ensure local community and biodiversity benefits. 
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This standard – developed through a partnership of non-governmental organizations, 
corporations, and research institutions – focuses exclusively on land based projects, 
including forestry projects. About 30% of the projects that use the CCBS are developed 
as CDM projects, and about 70% are looking to sell their offsets in the voluntary market 
(Kollmuss, 2009). 
Overarching guidance: Voluntary Certifications
In terms of the voluntary market,  the VCS-AFLOU and the CCBS  are the most widely used 
standards in developing tropical countries.  They are also among the most lucrative standards, 
with VCS certified credits getting between $10-$20/ton and credits certified by both the VCS & 
CCBS getting even more. This is driven, in part, by the expectation that VCS certificated credits 
will be accepted into a future compliance market, at least in the United States (pers com, Kyle 
Holland, Scientific Certification Systems). As such, their minimum standards provide the best 
road map available for how REDD projects will be developed.
There are no standards for community engagement in the VCS. The VCS-AFLOU standard is 
based exclusively on carbon storage above and below ground.  The Climate, Community, and 
Biodiversity Association standard, however, provides certification, based on the following 
criteria:
• Net Positive Community Impacts: The project must generate net positive impacts on the 
social and economic well-being of communities and ensure that costs and benefits are 
equitably shared among community members and constituent groups during the project 
lifetime.
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• Off-site Stakeholder Impacts: The project proponents must evaluate and mitigate any 
possible social and economic impacts that could result in the decreased social and 
economic well-being of the main stakeholders living outside the project zone resulting 
from project activities. Project activities should at least ‘do no harm’ to the well-being of 
off-site stakeholders.
• Community Impact Monitoring: The project proponents must have an initial monitoring 
plan to quantify and document changes in social and economic well-being resulting from 
the project activities (for communities and other stakeholders). The monitoring plan must 
indicate which communities and other stakeholders will be monitored, and identify the 
types of measurements, the sampling method, and the frequency of measurement. (CCBA 
Standards, 2009) 
In order to achieve the CCBA “Gold Standard”, the highest level of standards available through 
the CCBA, projects must: 
• “Demonstrate that the project zone is in a low human development country OR in an 
administrative area of a medium or high human development country in which at least 
50% of the population of that area is below the national poverty line.
•  Demonstrate that at least 50% of households within the lowest category of well-being (e. 
g., poorest quartile) of the community are likely to benefit substantially from the project.
• Demonstrate that any barriers or risks that might prevent benefits going to poorer 
households have been identified and addressed in order to increase the probable flow of 
benefits to poorer households.
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• Demonstrate that measures have been taken to identify any poorer and more vulnerable 
households and individuals whose well-being or poverty may be negatively affected by 
the project, and that the project design includes measures to avoid any such impacts. 
Where negative impacts are unavoidable, demonstrate that they will be effectively 
mitigated.
•  Demonstrate that community impact monitoring will be able to identify positive and 
negative impacts on poorer and more vulnerable groups. The monitoring of social impact 
... must take a differentiated approach that can identify positive and negative impacts on 
poorer households and individuals and other disadvantaged groups, including women.” 
(CCBA, 2009)
It is important to note that in none of these examples are specific methodologies for how to 
engage communities spelled out explicitly; the guidance provided above is the most detailed 
available in terms of community involvement. 
Communities and REDD: Who owns the forests and the carbon? 
While looking at the complexities of the world carbon market, it can become easy to loose track 
of the fact that credits traded actually represent real forests, where real people live. A long 
history of community involvement in conservation has preceded the development of REDD. 
Much of the world does not traditionally manage land in the manner that the West has adopted, 
characterized by private ownership and the right of an individual or corporation to exclude 
individuals from a given piece of land. Customary systems of land management are very diverse; 
often resources are held by clans, families, or other collective entities on the basis of diverse 
blends of group to individual rights. These access systems often cater for multiple resource uses 
24
and users, and boundaries between landholdings are often blurred and overlapping (Cotula, 
2009). Since the colonial era, the state has exerted control over the land and disregarded the 
traditional management structures that existed, generating profit for those in power. This has 
undermined local economies and has resulted in vast overuse of environmental resources, 
including deforestation and degradation, overgrazing, and overdrawn aquifers (Cotula, 2009). 
After the colonial era, land ownership shifted into the hands of the national governments. 
Currently, governments own over 75% of the world’s forests (RRI, 2009). Although ownership 
changed, the government’s attitudes towards the land often did not. In areas where the 
government has interests in developing the land, communities are not allowed access, and face 
widespread poverty, human rights abuses, inequity and political exclusion (RRI, 2009). This 
includes national parks; communities have often been excluded from conservation areas because 
it is believed that they will degrade them. In areas where the governments were not interested in 
developing the land, however, many communities have continued to manage their resources 
much as they have done traditionally, often unaware of the changes in legal land ownership. As 
governments reach deeper into their forests, forest dependent communities have become 
increasingly active in fighting for access to their land.  It is estimated that two-thirds of ongoing 
violent conflicts today are driven by contested claims to land and resources (Alden-Wiley, 2009). 
In terms of REDD, the conflict over land ownership is magnified because REDD benefits in the 
voluntary market flow to the individual community or company who owns the land (subject, of 
course, to government taxation). In areas where there is legal community ownership, the profits 
could be far greater than the cash value from traditional livelihoods. To complicate matters 
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further, land ownership does not, necessarily, correlate directly with carbon ownership. Carbon 
rights are a form of property right that commoditizes the carbon itself, and allows for trading. 
Until very recently, forest products were not valued for their carbon, and so no rights were 
assigned to carbon ownership. 
In interviews, almost all REDD project developers  acknowledged that communities must play a 
key role in project development to ensure its success, if only from the perspective of carbon 
conservation and business management (Griffiths, 2008; Hamilton, 2010; RRI, 2009). From the 
climate perspective there are a number of key reasons cited by project proponents for why 
communities must be involved-- leakage, permanence, and brand quality: 
1) Leakage is when forest destruction that is prevented in a REDD project area is moved to 
another area, and therefore fails to conserve carbon overall. For example, if a community 
is told that they are not allowed to cut down a forest to build a farm, they will simply cut 
down another forest where access is not limited—thereby negating any carbon 
sequestered in the original forest. Involving communities in creating sustainable 
livelihoods options that they accept can help ensure that they will not need to continue 
deforestation to sustain their livelihoods. 
2) Another concern is permanence, where forest that is supposed to be conserved is actually 
destroyed over time. Even under the best management practices, an unexpected carbon 
release may happen. Droughts, pest, or fire have the potential to revert yearlong carbon 
uptake within weeks or months (Schlamadinger et al. 2007).When industries offset their 
emissions through REDD offset credits, and the REDD credits are not permanent, the 
emissions from those companies may actually add to overall CO2 emissions. While much 
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of the threats to permanence come from nature, there is also risk associated with 
ineffective project management. For instance, if communities do not have incentives to 
maintain the carbon in the forest, they are likely to continue their usual practices, until 
they are punished in some way. This form of restrictive management requires strict 
monitoring and enforcement- forest management features often absent in the developing 
world (Agrawal and Angelsen, 2009). 
3) Brand quality: Ensuring that communities are not impoverished by REDD is also 
important from a  marketing perspective. Since consumers of voluntary credits are not 
required to purchase these credits, they tend to be more interested in the overall social 
and environmental impacts of their purchases.  In looking at websites that cater to selling 
credits to individual people interested in purchasing offsets (terrapass.org, 
carbonfund.org), it is clear that, while carbon offsetting is the primary goal, purchasers 
tend to want to think of themselves as people who are improving the world overall. This 
provides incentive for project developers to ensure that their projects do not destroy 




In this chapter, I will look at 23 REDD projects currently being developed in Indonesia, and at 
the ways in which they are planning on engaging communities, using the frame work of CFM 
indicators discussed in chapter one. In the next chapter, I will look at what I term “passive” 
benefits sharing, where projects give incentives to communities, instead of  involving them as 
decision makers in project development. 
Understanding Project Level Community Engagement 
Until recently, information on REDD projects was difficult to find. Many projects are just 
beginning to get off the ground, and project developers are not willing to share information 
before their projects are fully developed.  Nonetheless, it is still possible to collect information 
on specific projects. While there is no international database of REDD projects, summaries have 
been developed by research organizations—in particular the Center for International Forestry 
Research (CIFOR)—and international funding institutions, such as the World Bank (Wertz-
Kanounnikoff, 2009). Some more developed projects  have websites that provide basic 
information (www.merang-redd.org, etc). Other projects have project design documents – 
necessary for the Voluntary Carbon Standard certification process—that are available through 
the websites of their funders or NGO partners. The CCBA website contains project design 
documents for projects that are relatively far along in seeking certification—as of April 2010, 
there were 45 projects internationally that had project reports listed. Aside from these sources, 
project documents are only available by contacting project developers, and conducting 
interviews, as I did with 17 project developers. For more detailed information on the research 
process, see Annex 1.  
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Chart 1: Community Engagement in Projects 
 Project Name Project Spon-
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of the project 
Little legal  land 
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Management rules de-
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level government. Par-
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munity members is 





Communities are very 
diverse, from nomadic
indigenous peoples to 
migrant farmers. Communit-
ies generally have never in-
teracted. 
This project is designed to be a 
project of the Indonesian govern-
ment, facilitated, but not man-
aged, by The Nature Conservancy. 
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No legal land 
rights. Preliminary 
surveys show that 
communities make 
use of almost the 
entire peninsula.
Project developers are 
developing manage-
ment rules for the 
forest. 
Communities are 
being trained to 
work as forest 
wardens. 
Communities within project 
area are relatively homogen-
ous. They still follow a semi-
nomadic lifestyle harvesting 
fruits, rattan, and honey. 
There is strong and organized 
community level opposition to 
this project (REDD-monitor). 
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rubber tappers, and in the 
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distributed throughout the 
area. 
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donesia and Australia is supposed 
to be worth $30 million. 
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rights.
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community. The pro-
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Prior and Informed 
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cision making. 
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Communities are poor; they 
are traditionally fisher folk 
on the shore area, and cocoa 
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overlogging.
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receive training 
in how to guard 
the forest. 
Communities are poor. Com-
munity members will be 
trained to monitor and re-
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ald Planet
Understanding Community Engagement in REDD Projects 
In the next section, I summarize the information in the chart above into the clusters of variables 
discussed in chapter 1:
1) Resource System







Clarity of project boundaries Information generally not available
How much do people rely on the resource Variable, but high level of dependence on the 
resource in most cases
Information on forest size was available for all REDD projects surveyed, but was not particularly 
useful in helping assess likelihood of good conservation outcomes. Existing information on 
community forest management does not allow for generalizations about forest size above 10,000 
hectares (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009), and over 80% of REDD projects surveyed are over 
200,000 hectares. Project size numbers may be slightly misleading because total size of forest 
owned by a project developer is not always the same as the area that is being credited; project 
developers commonly seek credits for only a portion of their overall forest, choosing to leave 
part of their concessions intact to serve as a buffer in case forest from their crediting area is 
destroyed, for example, by forest fire. Clearly defined boundaries were not discussed in most of 
the available documentation, and so it remains unclear how boundaries will impact conservation 
success. In projects where boundaries were mentioned, project developers tended to mention that 
they helped make enforcement easier. In almost all of the projects surveyed, community 
members were highly dependent on the forests. The ways in which they used the forests varied 
widely-- many groups cleared small areas of forest for farming, one group cleared forests for fish 
ponds, others used wood from the forests for homes and boats-- but all projects has impacted 
community members who are highly dependent on the forest.  High levels of reliance on the 
forest would tend to predict positive outcomes for forest conservation; if communities can 
transfer dependence on forests to dependence on the profit that they make from carbon sales 
through REDD, it may also have positive impacts for success at carbon conservation. 
2) User Group




Large (over 100,000 
people)
4 7 4




Community Wealth Uniformly poor and 
resource dependent 
The literature on CFM shows that communities that are smaller and more homogenous tend to 
have a better success with conservation goals. Most REDD projects surveyed, however, tended 
to involve many different villages, and many different ethic groups. At one end of the spectrum, 
there are projects like the Berau Indonesia Climate Action Project, where over 100 villages and 
towns are within the project area. This includes people who are fully dependent on the forest to 
those who may never have set foot in a forest. At the other end of the spectrum, projects like 
Flora and Fauna International’s Danau Sentarum Project is seeking to focus REDD project 
development at the community level, and begin with a relatively homogenous community who 
have traditionally managed land together. According the the CFM literature, these smaller 
projects will have a better likelihood of achieving success in carbon conservation. 
Overall, communities who are impacted by REDD projects were categorized as “very poor” by 
project developers. This may be slightly misleading because project developers tend to only 
consider wealth as cash income, and possession of goods like motorcycles and televisions, and 
ignore resource wealth from the forest. Many communities were also characterized as not having 
adequate schooling or health care, and in need of cash income and development assistance. The 
CFM literature predicts that communities that are relatively well off will have more success in 
carbon conservation, and so may point to potential problems. Most communities are 
characterized as hunter/gatherers, farmers, or fishermen-- highly dependent on the quality of the 
natural environment for their livelihoods. This, however, seems to offer hope, as the CFM 
literature tends to find that communities that are highly dependent on a given resource tend to 






Rules designed by 
project developers
Rules designed by the 
government 
(local/national) 
  2 3 4
Community Level  
Legal Land Tenure
Low to nonexistent in all REDD projects
Rules that are easy to understand and 
enforce
 To be determined
The institutional arrangements surrounding CFM projects are often key to determining the 
likelihood of their success. Communities did not have legal rights to the land in any of the 
projects surveyed. This is not uncommon in Indonesia, where only two percent of the land is 
legally community owned (RRI, 2009). One project-- the Danau Sentarum REDD project 
developed by Flora and Fauna International-- is attempting to secure legal land rights for the 
community before developing the rest of the project. In most other projects surveyed, however, 
project developers considered procuring land rights for communities to be too risky and 
controversial, and likely to sour their relations with local government officials. CFM literature 
tends to predict that conservation will be most successful in areas where the communities have 
legal land tenure, which means that there may be challenges in carbon conservation in these 
project areas. In many areas – Kuala Kampar, as a prime example – communities consider 
themselves to be the land owners, because they have been using the land for generations. In areas 
where REDD projects have been developed on land that the community considers their own, 
projects have been rejected by communities, and there have been vocal protests.  
Not all surveyed projects had developed rules for governing forest access, but in those that had, 
there were three groups that were making the rules: the local community (with NGO facilitation), 
project developers/concession owners, and/or the government. In almost half of the projects, the 
government took the lead in determining the rules governing forest access. In most cases, this 
process included nominal participation by a representative of one or more of the affected 
community members, (although this was not always the case). In a third of the projects, the 
owners of the REDD concessions, or the people hired to develop projects on these concessions, 
developed the rules governing access to the forest. In these projects, community participation 
ranged from nonexistent — in the Mamuju Habitat Project— to protects that included a 
concerted effort to learn about traditional management and include some of those lessons in the 
project plans. Only two projects—the Katingan Conservation Area and the Danau Sentarum 
Lakes Plain Peat Swamp Forest—have explicitly stated that the affected communities are going 
to develop and determine rules governing forest access and conservation. 
How access rules are enforced also plays a role in helping predict project success. Six of the 
surveyed projects explicitly mentioned an attempt to use traditional forest management practices, 
or traditional forest boundaries, in developing their management plan. Only two projects, 
however, had the stated goal of using community forest management practices as the basis for 
the development of the management plan. The government and/or private interests that are 
enforcing access rules generally have more power than community members, because they have 
access to funds and coercive measures (they can have people arrested, etc). In interviews, most 
project developers said their goal was to use what one termed the “carrot and stick” method of 
enforcement—withholding payments to communities that were not successful in conserving 
forest carbon. Other project developers stated that they hoped that by providing alternative 
sources of income, communities would not have an incentive to destroy the forest. 
4) External Environment
Government stability and the price that the resource fetches in the market are both key factors in 
predicting conservation success. In the Indonesian context, government stability has been highly 
variable over the last two decades. After the fall of President Suharto in 1997, Indonesia went 
through a period of political instability. In 1997, Indonesia was hit hard by the East Asian 
Financial crisis, and the value of the Indonesian currency dropped precipitously. Indonesia was 
thrown into political turmoil, with five presidents coming into power between 1997 and 2004. 
Modern Indonesian politics has also been marked by decentralization of political power to the 
provincial and district level, where specific roles and responsibilities for forest management are 
often inconsistent or simply unenforced (Barr, 2010). Indonesia is also a notoriously corrupt 
country, which has also led to a  lack of trust in government at the community level. This lack of 
stability tends to predict a failure in resource conservation. 
Market price for commodities such as palm oil, pulp and paper, and timber are also an important 
component of  the potential for future conservation success. The market price for carbon is still 
extremely variable, with prices for a ton of carbon running anywhere from five cents on the 
Chicago Climate Exchange to $20-$30 for “boutique” carbon credits (carbon credits that 
supposedly have biodiversity or community co-benefits). The variability around carbon cost 
could have serious impacts on the sustainability of these projects. First, these projects are based 
on the idea that storing carbon in trees can compete financially with other forest uses, and 
therefore in order to ensure project permanence, the price of carbon must be able to compete 
with other uses of forest land. With the price of palm oil increasing—particularly if high oil 
prices make palm oil biofuels more viable on the market—palm oil could easily out-price forest 
carbon. This market variation, which is completely outside the scope of community control, 
could lead land holders to choose to pursue other money making ventures, instead of making 
money from REDD, to the overall detriment of the climate change mitigation.  
Summary
Looking at community engagement in REDD projects in Indonesia, the overwhelming theme is 
that of project diversity. Lacking specific guidance from the national government, the 
international development banks, the United Nations, or the voluntary certification standards, 
projects have developed in many different directions. There are, however, some overarching 
themes: Most REDD projects in Indonesia are extremely large, and in areas where communities 
do not have legal land rights, but are highly dependent on the forest. The rules for forest 
management are being developed outside of the community, often with little local input or 
participation. Project developers have acknowledged that benefits need to be shared with the 
community, but there is little consensus on how those benefits should be shared. Only a small 
minority of projects are engaging community members as decision makers, and are attempting to 
ensure that the benefits flow primarily to local communities. Of course, there are outliers on all 
ends; projects like the Katingan Conservation Area and the Danau Sentarum Project have 
engaged community-level facilitators in order to support communities in developing projects 
based on traditional forest management. At the other end of the spectrum, the project developers 
of the Mamuju Habitat project in West Sulawesi consider themselves to be developing a forestry 
projects, and do not consider communities to be legal stakeholders (although, as the project 
developer stated, “we can’t just throw them all into jail, so we have to give them something to 
stop deforestation”).  In the next chapter, I will look at how projects are engaging community 
members through passive mechanisms.  
Chapter 4
Passive Benefits Sharing 
REDD projects must engage communities in order to succeed. As discussed in Chapter 2, REDD 
projects must engage communities for the following reasons:
• To prevent leakage, and ensure that communities will not actually cut down another-- 
unprotected-- piece of forest when access to the forest managed for the REDD project is 
restricted. 
• To ensure permanence, and ensure that communities don't have incentives to go continue 
their practices that involve harvesting forest products and/or destroying the forest
• To protect brand quality, and ensure that they maintain the co-benefits of biodiversity 
conservation and community development  that make them so appealing in the first place 
(Hamilton, 2009)
In the cases of leakage and permanence, carbon conservation goals will necessarily be sacrificed 
if communities are not directly engaged. In terms of brand quality, the relationship is even more 
direct; community engagement itself is seen as a marketable goal. 
The importance of engaging communities, in one form or another, has been recognized in almost 
all of the projects surveyed. All except one (the Mamuju Project) have planned for ways to 
engage community members. While these methods of community engagement have not always 
meant community members are valued as decision makers, project developers have come up 
with other ways for to provide benefits to community members. I term this type of benefit 
sharing “passive”, because communities simply receive benefits, instead of actively determining 
their engagement in these projects. In the following chart I describe how the projects surveyed 
engaged communities with these passive benefits:
Chart 2: Passive Benefits Sharing
Name of Pr  Object "Direct" community engagement Service Provision Direct benefits (Presents) Jobs/Alternative Livelihoods Cash Payments 
Berau Indonesia Cli-
mate Action Project 
(3) (4)
Low level consultation through 
spokespeople
Unclear- but as a govern-
ment project it can be as-
sumed they would en-
deavor to provide the 
services the government 
would normally provide
[none] Undefined "investment in alternative 




Lakes Plain Peat 
Swamp Forest (11)
Mapping of customary/ adat forest 
land, Development of multistakehold-
er forest management units, Develop-
ment of community forest manage-
ment/agreements based on tradition-
al (adat) rights, Development of com-
munity institutions/cooperatives for 
management of these forest blocks
[none] [none] Capacity building and forest monitor-
ing and enforcement teams, "Develop-
ment of performance based alternat-
ive livelihood program"
development of local benefit sharing mechanisms 
to ensure equitable use of revenues,  support for 
alternative livelihoods such as fisheries, sustainable 
ag, and perhaps small scale eco-tourism , *possible 
micro-credit
Forest Land Use and 
Climate Change 
(FLUCC) (12)
Mapulus and Moposad are two co-
operative elements of the Minahasa 
and Mongondow cultures, which the 
project plans on tapping into to devel-
op community engagement [not 
defined future in materials]
[none] [none] Reforestation on degraded land and 
allocation of permits to exploit those 




Development of community resource 
management agreements with the 
forest-using communities to support 
restoration work
* Development of a mo-
bile school and is provid-
ing education to 32 indi-
genous children, * Sup-
porting the salaries of 
primary school teachers 
and provision of teaching 
materials in return for 
parental involvement 
and school attendance, * 
midwifery service, * help 
registering people for 
government services.
[none] Initiate programs to look at options for 
alternative livelihoods, including rat-
tan and hibiscus, recruitment and 
training of over 140 people as forest 
patrols and inventory teams
Micro-credit projects, Set up cooperatives that will 
include savings and loans, business and financing, 
and micro-credit schemes to help plant seedlings
Heart of Borneo Pro-
ject (14)
Payments may be dis-
bursed in the form of de-
velopment programs
Payment for Environmental Services model is being 
developed. 
Jayapura (14) Community land tenure mapping Payments may be dis-





Consultations with community lead-
ers. Facilitation of the development of 
of "village forests" that can take re-
sponsibility for REDD at the local level
[none] [none] [none] Incentive payments will be based on milestones 
such as capacity building and readiness activities, 
and later will be linked to actions that result in 
emissions reductions. Incentives will be include the 
following forms of payment: Input based- for imple-
menting interventions like building dams, planting 
trees, etc; Performance based- maintaining dams, 
protecting forest, etc; Out-come based- payments 
commensurate with GHG reductions. A trust fund 
under "impartial" management has been estab-
lished for micro-credit
Katigan Conservation 
Area (18) (19) (20)
In depth consultation with communit-
ies since early 2009, Publication of a 
newsletter that can be disseminated 
in the villages with information about 
the project and NGOs
Development of alternative sources of 
income such as rubber, rattan, je-
lutong (latex and cork), and gemor
development of "bio-rights" program where people 
get payments for reforestation efforts with seeds 
from the forest (unclear if these are loans or com-
pensation)
Lesuer National Park 
(5) (6)
[Information TBD]
Mamuju Habitat (13) [none] Support will be given to 
communities in improv-
ing their cocoa planta-
tions, which are within 
the project area. 
[none] Jobs will be made available in the tree 





Stated goal of Free Prior and Informed 
Consent. Local people will "maintain 
access to traditional  lands which will 
be determined through participatory 
mapping and will be respected in the 
development of the protected area"
Improved health services [none]  Direct employment in the project, 
Employment for fire training to pre-
vent and control fires (financial bo-
nuses for communities where there 
are no fires), Employment for forest 
regeneration, Opportunities to parti-
cipate in agricultural and livelihoods 
diversification programs, * Training by 
artisans to promote use of non-timber 
forest products
Microcredit
Merang REDD (15) [none] [none] [none]  Support for raising chickens, Develop-
ment of village nurseries with 100,000 
seedlings, Development of community 
forest rangers program-  two of these 
groups with 15 members each have 
(unclear if these groups are paid or un-
paid)
[none]
Rimba Raya (1) (2) Consultation  Early Childhood Educa-
tion Program, Health 
care services (floating 
clinic)
One Laptop per Child, Low-
fuel cook stoves, solar light-
ing, 
Aquaponic Agriculture, Community 
agroforestry (where communities are 
given plots of land where they can 
plant and harvest fruit trees, "sister 
community" program with Seminole 





[none] Payments may be dis-
bursed in the form of de-
velopment programs
[none] [none] Payment for Environmental Services model is being 
developed. 
Tesso Nilo Pilot Pro-
ject (14)
[none] Payments may be dis-
bursed in the form of de-
velopment programs
[none] [none] Payment for Environmental Services model is being 
developed. 
Ulu Masen National 
Park (7)
Engaging the traditional Mukim lead-
ers, who are traditionally responsible 
for natural resource management, 
Participatory spatial planning, includ-
ing mukim planning and livelihood 
activities,. From the proposal: "indi-
genous people and communities 
should be encouraged and supported 
in developing distribution mechan-
isms" & "prior and informed consent 
based on customary land tenure ar-
rangements and resource access 
rights of local communities should be 
sought prior to the establishment of 
Carbon Forests of other substantive 
changes in land use"
[none] [none] Hiring people as forest wardens Incentive payments (initially from development 
aid), Grants provided to civil society organizations 
for independent monitoring, Funds for the com-
munities: Community Development Fund (incentive 
to sign forest protection contracts, can be used for 
small-scale infrastructure projects), Alternative 
Livelihoods Funds (funds to help develop alternat-
ive livelihoods - like coffee production), Com-
munity-based Forestry Funds (to develop low im-
pact forestry projects and possibly do inventories, 
etc)
Projects which were 
mentioned, where 
no information was 
available
Notes 









Meru Betiri National 
Park (23)
* (Interesting note- that particular group of Seminole actu-
ally make their money through casinos)
Information provided for all projects from: Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Sheila, and Metta Kongphan-apirak. "Emerging Redd+: A Preliminary Survey of Demonstration and Readiness Activities " CIFOR Working Paper 46 (2009).
(1) Personal Communcation with Todd Lemons, CEO and Chairman, Infinite Earth
(2) Infinite Earth. "The Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve Project: Redd in Central Kalimantan (Borneo) Indonesia." Pangkalan Bun, Indonesia, 2009.
(3) Personal Communication, Jill Blockhus,  Senior Policy Advisor at The Nature Conservancy
(4) The Nature Conservancy. "Berau Forest Carbon Program: Delivering Practical Solutions to Support Development of a National-Level Redd Framework in Indonesia." edited by The Nature Conservancy, 2009.
(5) Personal Communication, G.Viswanatha Reddy, Ecosystem Manager, Leuser International Foundation
(6) Personal Communication, Mike (?)
(7) Provincial Government of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Flora and Fauna International, and Carbon Conservation Pty.Ltd. "Reducing Carbon Emissions from Deforestation in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem, Aceh, Indonesia."  (2007 ).
(8) Personal Communication, Timothy Jessup, Forest and Climate Specialist, AusAID
(9) Australia Indonensia Partnership, "Kalimantan Forests and Carbon Partnership: A Case Study", January 2010
(10) Australian Government Initiative. "Kalimantan Forest and Climate Partnership." Factsheet (December 2009).
(11) Flora and Fauna International. "Reducing Emissions from Peat Swamp Forest Conversion and Degradation: Danau Sentarum Lakes Plain Peat Swamp Forest." Kapuas Hulu, West Kalimantan, Indonesia, undated.
(12)ONF International. "Redd in North Sulawesi: Kph Poigar Project " Powerpoint Presentation (undated).
(13) Mamuju Habitat. 2009.  In Project Report,   http://www.keepthehabitat.org/documents/file/4502KTH%20Mamuju%20Project%20Flyer_FINAL.pdf. (accessed April 16 2010).
(14) Ardiansyah, Fitrian, Iwan Wibisono, and Zulfira Warta. "Redd Potential Pilot Projects " WWF Powerpoint Presentation (undated).
(15) Merang REDD project. Merang REDD, www.merang-redd.org/REDD/index. (accessed April 2010, 2010).
(16) ??
(17)Birdlife International, RSPB, and Burung Indonesia. 2010. Harapan Rainforst Redd Website.  In, http://harapanrainforest.org/. (accessed April 16 2010)
(18) Personal Communication, Rezal Kusumaatmadja, Managing Director, Starling Resources 
(19) O'Brian, Tim. 2009. Conservation and Carbon in Borneo's Heart and Ours.  In, ed. Rhett Butler.  www.news.mongabay.com/2009/1104-obrien_katingan.html. (accessed April 29, 2010)
(20) Starling Resouces. "Katingan Conservation Area: A Global Peatland Capstone Project." Sanur, Bali, Indonesia, 2008.
(21) BOS Foundation. "Brief Summary of Mawas Conservation Program Initiatives."  (2009).
(22) Zoological Society of London, "Berbak Carbon Initiative: Conservation for Carbon, Communities, and Biodiversity." London, England: Zoological Society of London, 2010.
(23) Ok, Ma Hwan. "Itto Support to Redd Demonstration Activities in Indonesia." Powerpoint Presentation (2010).
(24) Per com. Fitrian Ardiansyah, Program Director, Climate and Energy , WWF- Indonesia

In summary, passive benefits sharing falls into four categories: 
1) Service provision: 
Of the 23 projects surveyed, 9 projects mention providing necessary services – like health clinics 
and primary schools – as part of their community engagement process. The Indonesian 
government has programs to provide education and health care to its citizens, but because of  a 
history of mismanagement and corruption (Barr, 2010) this is often not the case. Service 
provision in Indonesia is very poor, and many communities do not have access to schools and 
health clinics. These services were also considered to be more valuable to the community than 
gifts (see below) because they were necessary for the community's well being. On the other 
hand, in interviews, project proponents did express concern that communities expect to receive 
many of these services from the government, and may not see them as additional benefits; 
instead, they may view them as only what they are due as citizens. It also begs the question 
whether, if communities were to continue using the forest or were to shift their activities, would 
REDD project developers withhold classes and health services?
2) Direct benefits/ gifts: 
Direct benefits, or gifts, are benefits that are given to each family or community in a project area. 
These direct benefits are sometimes related to decreasing dependence on the forest (for example, 
low fuel cook stoves), while others are simply aimed at improving quality of life overall in the 
project area (for example, one laptop per child). Only one project focused on these direct 
benefits-- the Rimba Raya project in Central Kalimantan, which, incidentally, is likely to be the 
first certified REDD project in the world.
3) Jobs/alternative livelihoods:
All projects involved creating new jobs for people directly impacted by the project.  In areas 
where communities have depended on the forest for generations, project proponents recognized 
the need to provide alternative livelihoods to community members. The most common jobs 
provided were as forest wardens to monitor forest condition during the project’s lifespan. Other 
common alternative livelihoods provisions included support for the development of non-timber 
forest products like rattan and sandlewood. Some projects –  for example, the Katingan 
Conservation Area project — included strategies to help communities market these products, and 
then return the profits to the community. In the Katingan project, the project developer partnered 
with Tropical Salvage, a small company that makes high end furniture from salvaged wood in 
order to provide benefits to community members. There are a number of concerns with this type 
of benefit sharing-- one, that there will not be enough jobs for everyone, particularly women, and 
two, that people might simply prefer to pursue their traditional livelihoods rather than work for 
the REDD project. In most projects surveyed, alternative livelihoods mechanisms were 
developed with little or no input from the community. It is not certain that these alternatives will 
be able to provide sustainable and fulfilling alternatives to traditional practices that will be 
locally appropriate in the long run. 
4) Cash payments: 
Nine projects specifically reference providing communities with cash payments in return for not 
using the forest. Five of the 23 projects surveyed explicitly mentioned a Payment for 
Environmental Services model, which focuses on paying communities to conserve resources that 
provide valuable ecosystem services—for example, paying communities to conserve a forest in 
order to protect downstream communities from flooding. These payments can be delivered to 
communities as cash payments per individual or family, in the form of cash payments or an 
ATM card. Another variation on cash payments,  micro-credit schemes, were proposed in four of 
the projects. In these micro-credit schemes,  communities are able to take out small loans to 
support projects that could provide alternative livelihoods. Still other projects are developing 
more elaborate payment models, for example the Kalimantan Forest Carbon Partnership, where 
there are different incentive models being developed. These incentives are either input based (for 
implementing interventions like building dams, planting trees, etc), performance based 
(providing payments in return for maintaining dams, protecting forest, etc), or out-come based 
(payments commensurate with greenhouse gas reductions). 
Why Passive Benefits?
All project developers interviewed acknowledged that communities must be engaged in order to 
ensure that the projects are successful, even if they did not agree on how those community 
members should be engaged. There were two related reasons why project developers tended to 
prefer passive benefits to engaging community members more directly:
• Time: Project proponents also argue that passive mechanisms are  faster than direct 
community engagement, which, they argue, will improve the likelihood for overall 
project success. In interviews, some project proponents expressed shock at the amount of 
time that NGOs asked them to spend working with the community. To paraphrase one 
project proponent, “Community engagement is a relevant variable, but I am paid 
depending on how much carbon I conserve. The longer I spend consulting community 
members is time I am not getting a return on my investment.”Another concern was that 
encroachment from palm oil plantations and illegal logging would put the forest at risk, if 
projects waited too long to developing the projects with the communities. The fear was 
that the longer before projects are certified, and before money comes in for enforcement, 
the more actual forest is being lost. 
• Money: The majority (20 of 23) of the projects surveyed were being developed with 
explicit goal of making money for the project developer. With carbon credits from 
projects predicted to sell for $10/ton (Fogarty, 2010), projects stand to make huge sums 
of money. Since the goal is to make a profit, it would be counter productive to develop 
mechanisms where community members receive a large share of the profits from the sale 
of credits. Passive engagement mechanisms are relatively inexpensive, but still enable 
project developers to say that they are benefiting the community, and therefore they are 
able to get a premium for their REDD carbon credits. Some project proponents argue that 
providing larger sums of money, which would better reflect the amount of money that 
project developers were receiving, would overwhelm the local market, and totally change 
the economic realities of the area.
The tension between community engagement, carbon conservation, time, and money was 
expressed in all interviews with project proponents. In the next chapter, I will explore how 
different project are balancing those tensions, and what types of projects are gaining steam in 
Indonesia. 
CHAPTER 5
Predicting Conservation Success: Lessons from CFM
Project proponents argue that REDD provides some of the best hope available for conserving 
ecosystem function and mitigating climate change, while benefiting forest dependent 
communities, and conserving biodiversity. But are they correct? In this chapter, I look at overall 
trends in how projects have engaged communities, and look at the impact that may have on the 
potential to achieve carbon conservation goals. I will also look at passive benefits sharing, as 
discussed in chapter 4, and look at the challenges that those mechanisms may create. Finally, I 
will also look at the challenges that different REDD projects may face in the future, and consider 
next steps to ensure that community rights will be at the core of REDD project development in 
the future.  
Engagement Models
There are four main trends in how communities are being engaged REDD projects. Projects do 
not fall exclusively into one trend or another-- instead most projects combine aspects of these 
different trends. Going from most to least community focused, these are the following: Direct 
Engagement, Payment for Environmental Services, Service/Gift Provision, and Jobs/Alternative 
Livelihoods.
Small, Community-focused Projects
Two projects –  Danau Sentarum and Ulu Masen – prioritize rights of communities within 
REDD. Both of these projects are using participatory forest management techniques, basing the 
REDD area on traditional land use patterns, and developing access plans based on traditional 
lands rights and management practices. In both cases management plans were based in the Free 
Prior and Informed Consent of  community members, and management of the forest blocks is 
planned to be done by community groups. These projects reflect characteristics that tend to 
predict success in community forest management. Project areas tend to be relatively small, and a 
relatively small number of people tend to be engaged in managing the area. Rules for the area 
tend to be locally designed, and therefore it is more likely that they will be locally accepted. At 
the same time, these projects face a number of challenges. In terms of external environment, 
these projects face the challenges that all REDD projects in Indonesia face; the lack of stability 
in the national government and the lack of stability in carbon prices are both very real 
challenges. They also face challenges that projects that use other engagement mechanisms are 
not as vulnerable to: they have taken a long time to develop, and have trouble attracting capital 
for development because they cannot promise results and profits in the same time frame as other 
projects.  
Medium sized, profit sharing projects 
Five projects explicitly mentioned the use of a Payment for Environmental Services (or PES) 
model, where communities’ access to land is limited in exchange for cash payments for 
maintaining the ecosystem. This model has already been used extensively in conservation efforts 
internationally (Peskett, 2008).  These projects tend to be physically larger than direct 
engagement projects, which one would predict would worsen their chances of  having successful 
conservation outcomes. In these projects, rules for management also tend to developed outside 
the communities, which would tend to predict challenges with carbon conservation efforts. These 
projects, like all projects in Indonesia, face the external challenges of unstable national policy 
and unstable carbon prices.  
Medium sized- service and gift sharing projects 
Almost half of the projects offered what amounts to one time gifts or services. These varied 
widely between projects-- they were  anything from solar panels and cook stoves to more 
essential services like primary schools and health care clinics. This is, in essence, the same 
toolkit that has been used by national parks and plantations to mollify communities whose land is 
being used for purposes other than those desired by the traditional owners. Only one project-- the 
Rimba Raya project in Central Kalimantan-- focused exclusively on sharing small gifts (cook 
stoves and laptops).  Projects that focused on service and gift provision tended to be large, and 
not based in the traditional management practices or knowledge of the community. The 
problematic external indicators are, of course, the same for all projects in Indonesia. Viewed 
through the lens of the CFM indicators, these projects will have a lower likelihood of success in 
carbon conservation than other projects, which engage communities more directly. 
Large, profit-focused projects 
Finally, most projects included creating alternative livelihoods or jobs. With so much of local 
livelihoods coming from the forest, project developers recognize that communities will need 
alternatives if they are to keep from using the forest (and therefore putting forest carbon at risk). 
Options that are being explored range from helping communities to raise chickens, to helping 
develop aquaponics, to providing jobs directly in the project. Only one project explicitly stated 
that it was only interested in job creation, not in other passive benefits. This project—the 
Mamuju Habitat project— was identified by the project developer as a “sustainable forest 
management” project, where the primary economic benefit is to come from the sale of timber, 
and supplemented by REDD credits as the market allows. According to the CFM indicators, 
these large, externally managed projects with little community buy in are the least likely to be 
successful in carbon conservation. 
The future of community engagement in REDD: 
What we see overall in terms of community engagement in REDD projects is that, in the tension 
between doing quick and profitable projects and engaging communities, project developers are 
focusing on moving projects forward quickly, and providing passive benefits. Project proponents 
hope that these passive benefits will be enough to keep communities from continuing activities 
that damage the carbon stock or  moving their destructive activities to other forests. Of course, 
community engagement mechanisms are not the only factor that will define if a project is 
successful or not--market pressure, land change pressures, etc, all matter a great deal-- but what 
the literature on community forest management shows is that this is these projects are less likely 
to be successful in conserving carbon, overall.
In identifying community engagement in REDD projects, some over all concerns come to light. 
First and foremost, engaging communities in REDD projects through passive mechanisms has 
the risk of making communities dependent on companies and on a global market that they have 
no control over. Particularly in the case of service provision-- where schools and health clinics 
are provided by project developers--  project failure could have devastating consequences for the 
community. In other areas project failure would mean the end of alternative livelihoods for the 
community, or other payments which community members would have come to depend upon. 
There is also the issue of the vast disparity between the amount of money that project developers 
receive and the amount they pass on to community members-- who are often the traditional land 
owners-- in services and benefits. 
The question then becomes, is it possible to develop REDD projects that can conserve carbon, 
while ensuring that communities don't become dependent on outside market sources? I would 
argue that the Direct Engagement model of REDD projects, while only in nascent stages, can 
provide a potential source of best practices. These projects are providing on the ground lessons in 
the best way to engage communities in REDD, while still respecting the lessons that CFM 
presents about community engagement and conservation success. As REDD continues to 
develop in the market, lessons on how best to use community knowledge, community forest 
management practices, and provide ownership of REDD projects to communities, all within a 
timely manner, will become increasingly useful.
Future Challenges 
While it may be possible to develop best practices for REDD project development in Indonesia, 
the larger economic context for REDD remains in flux. The future market for REDD may face a 
number of different challenges, in terms of community involvement; here I explore three:
• The development of a compliance market for REDD: The end of boutique carbon? It 
seems almost certain that the compliance market, being developed through the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, will include REDD offsets as a 
mechanism to help developed countries save money while meeting their emissions reduction 
requirements (Griffiths, 2008). As the compliance market is far larger than the voluntary 
market, this will mean a massive increase in the demand for REDD credits, which have the 
potential to change the type of project being developed. REDD projects designed for the 
voluntary market are, as some term it, “boutique carbon”. This carbon is being purchased by 
people who are not required to buy it, but are doing so for moral or public relations reasons, 
and are much more likely to be concerned about the impact that their carbon purchase has on 
communities and biodiversity. Following simple market logic, however, it is likely that 
industrial sectors in developed countries will want to purchase carbon at the cheapest price 
available, and will therefore be less concerned with costly efforts to ensure community 
participation and rights. While this will not necessarily mean the end of the boutique carbon 
market, it does mean that there will be much stronger demand for REDD projects that 
provide carbon at the lowest possible cost.   
• The development of national level REDD:  The REDD market is moving away from sub-
national projects, and towards national level projects where deforestation and forest 
degradation is measured for an entire country. The benefits of this are clear; when national 
policies are developed to avoid deforestation and degradation, there is less likelihood of 
leakage within the country. However, with national level REDD projects, benefits from 
projects flow to the national government- with no required distribution to communities. This 
incentivizes the government to maintain ownership of all forested land. National-level REDD 
may, in fact, provide a perverse incentive and keep communities from being able to get legal 
rights to their traditionally owned land. 
• The variability of the Carbon market: Elite Capture, or Palm Oil plantations? The 
variability of the price of carbon is another major challenge for the REDD market. Carbon 
prices have varied substantially over the years, from US$.05/metric ton on the Chicago 
Climate Exchange, to over $30/metric ton for prime “boutique” carbon. The 2008 average 
price was US$6.12/ metric ton (Forest Carbon Portal, 2010). To be successful, carbon prices 
have to compete over the long term with other commodities that can be grown in the forest-- 
particularly palm oil. Palm oil prices have been on a steady rise, and are predicted to become 
even higher as oil prices go higher, and palm oil biodiesel becomes a viable alternative to 
regular diesel. Governments are unlikely to give concessions for REDD projects if they are 
more likely to get a better long term profit from logging and growing oil palm. This is not a 
problem that will be solved by improving community land rights; if land owning 
communities see that they are likely to make a better profits from oil palm than REDD, they 
are likely to choose to plant oil palm as well. 
Conclusion:
Overall, the development of the REDD market poses many challenges for forest dependent 
communities. Existing projects developers have identified the need to engage communities, but 
they have done so only on a superficial level, which has meant that communities are faced  the 
possibility of becoming increasingly dependent on outside companies and the international 
market. They are also facing increased competition for existing forested land, which means that 
the few communities who have been able to maintain a forest-dependent lifestyle will now have 
to compete with international corporations for access to the land. At the same time, REDD 
provides renewed promise for forest conservation and for the climate. As some on-the-ground 
projects have shown, there are ways to engage communities and put them at the forefront of 
REDD project development. At the same time, the literature-- and common sense-- show is that 
engaging communities is a necessary part of creating a practical and sustainable REDD project. 
While the future of the REDD market is unclear, conserving the world's climate and forests 
remains a priority. By paying close attention to how communities are engaged at this early stage 
of the game, we can move towards a future where the twin goals of environmental conservation 
and community empowerment are supported internationally. 
Appendix 1. REDD Projects in Indonesia (April 2010)
Google map available at: http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?
ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&msid=110458241903953258876.000485a0011c754e1b067&z=4
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Appendix 2:  Detailed Research Methodology
Despite the rapid development of the market for REDD credits, information on these projects is 
not publicly available, and therefore research collecting it had to take a variety of different 
forms. I initially identified projects through looking at Emerging REDD+: A Preliminary Survey  
of Demonstration and Readiness Activities, a report from the Center for International Forestry 
Research, written by Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff (2009). This report identified 44 REDD 
demonstration activities across the world, with 23 of those projects developed in Indonesia. The 
next step was to go through these projects one by one, and find any available information about 
these groups on the internet.  Information was patchy; certain projects had up-to-date websites, 
while others were not mentioned at all. I contacted Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff and her co-
author, Metta Kongphan-Apirak, for suggestions on desk research methodologies that they 
recommended, which led to a thorough collection of online materials. 
In order to learn more about the projects, it was necessary to reach out to the larger network of 
people that I have worked with in previous projects. Many of the people who used to work on 
other forest related issues in Indonesia have now moved their efforts on to REDD. Through these 
networks, I was able to set up interviews with project developers and proponents. I focused my 
interviews on project developers, particularly those who whose projects were not well 
documented online. I decided to focus on project developers, rather than other people working on 
REDD-- for instance, advocacy groups-- because I wanted to understand what projects were 
planned, rather than simply understanding what was currently being experienced on the ground. 
I was in contact with individuals from 20 of the 22 projects, and conducted semi-structured 
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phone interviews with 17 project developers. I failed to get in touch with project proponents in 
two cases, giving up only after three emails had gone unanswered.  Interviews with project 
developers were supplemented with interviews with NGO activists, policy proponents at the 
national and international level, and project certifiers. 
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